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Abstract. The article aims to assess the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime 
established more than 40 years ago with the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since that time the international community had achieved con-
siderable success in the prevention of nuclear weapons’ proliferation. Nevertheless, while 
noting the results of the NPT and the verification system established under that instrument, one 
cannot remain silent about the shortcomings of the system and the non-compliance with some 
of its provisions. By its structure and provisions the NPT has divided States into two groups, 
distinguishing those possessing and those not possessing nuclear weapons. In effect, the rights 
and obligations of the Contracting Parties to the NPT are tailored to the group to which they 
belong, and the gravest violation of the NPT is that when States seek to change their status as 
defined in the NPT, notably by trying to munfacture or control of nuclear weapons. Under the 
NPT, research in, production and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are 
inalienable rights, but their exercise should be in keeping with the basic obligation of non-
nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty not to acquire in any form nuclear weapons and not to 
carry out unauthorized nuclear activities under the guise of their peaceful nuclear programs. 
While emphasizing the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, the article describes in 
nutshell the nuclear program of two States (the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea) which gave cause for serious international concern. 
 
Keywords: Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear weapons 
proliferation, peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, nuclear-free zones, International Atomic 
Energy Agency, safeguards, nuclear export, KEDO, Nuclear Suppliers Group, India, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
 
 
More than four decades ago that on the 12th June 1968 the United Nations 
General Assembly, by its resolution 2373 (1968), adopted with a vast majority 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which was the 
result of more than ten years’ negotiations in the United Nations and in the 
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.1 
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 1 The solemn singing of the Treaty took place simultaneously in London, Moscow and 
Washington on 1 July 1968, and the instrument entered into force on 5 March 1970.  
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 This instrument, by which the international community tried to prevent the 
world-wide spread of nuclear weapons and sought to remove, at long term, 
this destructive device from the arsenals of States, has been regarded as one 
of the most important disarmament agreements down to our times. The main 
purpose of the Treaty was to halt all direct and indirect forms of access of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devises by those States which do not 
possessed them at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty.2 
 Subject to the remark that the cause of nuclear disarmament cannot be 
judged from the operation of a single instrument, it may be stated that since 
the entry into force of the NPT there has been made significant progress 
towards achieving the objectives the Treaty. 
 According to some estimates, there would be 30 to 40 nuclear-weapon States 
today had the Non-Proliferation Treaty not been concluded.3 Unfortunately, 
however, the number of de facto nuclear-weapon States has grown despite the 
NPT. These States include India and Pakistan, which carried out nuclear test 
explosions in 1998,4 and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, 
North Korea), which in October 2006 informed world public of having carried 
out an underground nuclear explosion. Other States, which will be discussed at 
a later stage, are but supposed to be secretly working on nuclear weapons 
programs.5 In our days there are virtually 9 nuclear-weapon States, namely the 
5 nuclear powers as well as India, Pakistan, Israel and DPRK, with none of the 
latter being a party to the NPT.6 It is worth mentioning that to this very day 
                                                     
 In our days there is a voluminous literature on the Treaty. Of these publications see in 
particular Willrich, M.: Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control. 
Charlottesville, Virginia, 1969; Fischer, G.: The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
London, 1971; Bellany, I.–Blacker, C. D.–Gallacher, J. (eds.): The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. London, 1985; Delcoigne, G.–Rubinstein, G.: Non-Proliferation des armes nucléaires. 
Editions de l’Institut de Sociologie, Bruxelles, 1970. 
 2 Under Art. 9, Para. 3, of the NPT “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon 
State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.”. 
 3 Cf. Timerbaev, R.: What next for the NPT? Facing the Noment of Truth. IAEA 
Bulletin, 46 (2005) No. 2, 4. 
 4 In May 1998 both States carried out a series of 5 nuclear test explosions each and 
both Governments announced their undertaking a voluntary moratorium on further explosions. 
On the test explosions by India and Pakistan, see Kile, S.: Nuclear Arms Control and non-
proliferation. SIPRI Yearbook 1999. Armament, Disarmament and International Security. 
Oxford, 1999. 520–522. 
 5 Iran, Israel and Libya are usually referred to as such States. 
 6 The nuclear warheads possessed by India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel number 
70 to 120, 30 to 80, 1 to l0, and 75 to 200 respectively. Cf. www.uspw.org.  
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South Africa is the only State which had formerly possessed nuclear weapons 
but voluntary gave up its nuclear arms. In the 1980s the racist regime of South 
Africa has developed nuclear weapons, but all of these weapons were dismantled 
in the early 1990s.7 
 It can be claimed as a success by any measure that the NPT, which was 
originally adopted for a term of 25 years, was extended indefinitely and without 
condition at the Fifth Review and Extension Conference of 1995 by virtue of 
Art. X. Para. 2, of the NPT.8 Further progress is marked by the fact that today 
188 States are party to the Treaty, with all nuclear powers having adhered to 
the NPT, for the original signatories to the Treaty did not include two nuclear-
weapon States, France and China. Precisely for this reason, the accession of 
China on 9 March 1992 and then of France on 2 August of that year were 
events of great importance to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The effectiveness of the NPT regime is further evidenced by 
hundreds of on-site inspections executed annually by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) by way of verification of the fulfilment of the treaty 
                                                     
 A known view claims that in the absence of the NPT nuclear weapons would today be 
possessed by Argentina, Australia, Belorussia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and Ukraine, as well as former Yugoslavia along with the 9 
States mentioned above. Cf. Bunn, G.: The world's Non-Proliferation Regime in Time. IAEA 
Bulletin, 46 (2005) No. 2. 8. 
 7 South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, and until the end of 1992 the IAEA 
conducted inspections at 75 sites in the country, one at a dismantled uranium-enriching 
unit and one in a desert region where nuclear tests had been carried out previously. 
 8 See resolution No. 3 adopted at the Fifth Conference on the Review and Extension 
of the NPT. United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1995. 27–28. 
 Review conferences are provided for by the NPT in Para. 3 of Art. VIII, under which 
on expiry of 5 years from the entry into force of the Treaty the implementation thereof is 
to be reviewed by a conference and at 5-year periods. Thereafter the majority of the States 
parties may request the convening of more such conferences. Review conferences were 
held on that basis in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
 Extension of the term of the Treaty is covered by Para. 2 of Art. X, stating that, by the 
lapse of 25 years from the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference is to decide whether 
the NPT should continue in force for an unspecified term, or its operation should be 
prolonged for a specified term or for further specified terms. 
 On the Review and Extension Conference of 1995, see Simpson, J.: The nuclear non-
proliferation regime after the NPT Review and Extension Conference. SIPRI Yearbook 1996. 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, 1996. 561–573. 
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obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States,9 as well as by the comprehensive 
safeguards agreements which the Agency has concluded with 82 States.10 
 
 
I. Criticisms levelled at the NPT 
 
Nevertheless, while noting the results of the NPT and its system of verification, 
one cannot remain silent about the fact that ever since its adoption the Treaty 
has received several criticisms partly for its deficiencies, partly for non-
compliance with some of its provisions. In what follows I wish to single out 
but a few of them. 
 
a) The nuclear disarmament  
 
One of the objections most frequently raised in connection with the NPT 
concerns the fact that the instrument, apart from the provisions of the Preamble 
thereto, refers to disarmament in a single provision (Art. VI.), spelling out that  
 
“Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament as well as to a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. 
 
The cited provision is undoubtedly formulated in rather general terms, and, 
although nuclear disarmament is to be expected primarily from the nuclear-
weapon States (since, after the entry into force of the instrument, such weapons 
  
 9 In virtue of Art. III. of the Non-proliferation Treaty the fulfilment of the obligations 
undertaken by the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty is to be verified by the 
IAEA applying its safeguards system. Under Para. 1 of Art. X, non-nuclear-weapon States 
are required to subject all their peaceful nuclear activities to the IAEA safeguards. 
 On this score see Cooley, J. N.: International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges in Implemen-
tation. In: Avenhaus, R.–Kyriakopoulos, N.–Richard, M.–Stein, G. (eds.): Verifying Treaty 
Compliance. Berlin-Heidelberg, 2006. 61–76. 
 10 A review of the IAEA safeguards system had become necessary by the l990s. In 
order to strengthen the system and to increase its efficiency, the Agency prepared in 1997 
a supplementary model protocol on the safeguards agreements (see IAEA INFCIRS/540). 
On the model protocol see Priest, J.–Rockwood, L.: Protocols for Strengthened Safeguards: 
Progress and Prospects. IAEA Bulletin, 41 (1999) No. 4. 14–23. 
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may only be possessed by those States), the NPT makes it an obligation of all 
Contracting Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith. 
A great shortcoming of the NPT consists in containing no further provisions 
on such negotiations, failing as it does to indicate a deadline for commencing 
negotiations or a date, if only an approximate one, for the destruction of the 
world’s nuclear arsenal. 
 As regards the Treaty’s provisions on nuclear disarmament talks, it is worth 
while to note that the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 
1996 on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, made a special 
point of Art. VI. of the NPT, emphasizing that the said Art. provides not only 
for the conduct of negotiations, but also for the need for such negotiations “to 
achieve a precise result–nuclear disarmament in all its aspects”. In the Court’s 
view this twofold obligation applies to all parties to the Treaty, i.e. to the 
overwhelming majority of the international community (at the time the advisory 
opinion was rendered there were 182 States party to the NPT).11 An insuffi-
ciency of the advisory opinion, as Matheson points out, that it “does not 
dictate any timetable or negotiating forum for reaching this result”.12 For that 
matter, Richard A. Falk notes on the advisory opinion that the Court has 
certainly created a clear situation with respect to the future: “either a specific 
prohibition of nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament”.13 
 There is no doubt that the past four decades have witnessed considerable 
step forward with respect to nuclear disarmament. However, the NPT provi-
sions on nuclear disarmament have only been implemented in part, albeit the 
one-time Soviet Union, or Russia and the United States have signed highly 
important agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons14 and there have 
  
 11 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Advisory Opinion, 8 July 
1996. I.C.J. Reports, 1966. 263–264. 
 12 Cf. Matheson, M. J.: The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. American Journal of International Law, 91 (1997) 
434. 
 13 Falk, R. A.: Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic 
Encounter. American Journal of International Law, 91 (1997) 75. 
 14 See the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (commonly known as SALT I) which 
resulted in the conclusion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the SALT 
II in 1972. One should mention also the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) started 
in 1982.  
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been cuts in the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States 
and Russia.15 
 Apart from all these results, however, the number of nuclear warheads 
existing in the world today can be put at 13,000, of which 11,000 are possessed 
by the United States and Russia.16 
 The fact that international agreements have by now established nuclear-
weapons-free zones in different parts of the globe can be seen as an important 
step towards nuclear disarmament. The signing of these treaties is closely 
interrelated whit the NPT, all the more so since Art. VII. of the NPT specifically 
refers to nuclear-weapons-free zones in providing that  
 
“Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude 
regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in 
their respective territories.” 
 
 It is due to all this that one can speak, on the one hand, of certain zones not 
belonging to any State like Antarctica, outer space and the sea-bed as being 
free from nuclear weapons and, on the other, of the establishment of regional 
nuclear-weapons-free zones in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967) and 
in the South Pacific Region (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985), in South-East Asia 
(Treaty of Bangkok, 1995), in Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996), and recently 
in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk, 2006).  
 In the 1990s an outstanding event in the field of nuclear disarmament was 
the opening of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for signature 
at New York on 24 September 1996. However, the CTBT has not entered into 
force to this very day, although it was signed by 180 and ratified by 148 States. 
This delay in entry into force can be ascribed to the fact that certain States, on 
whose accession the operation of the Treaty is conditional; have not yet ratified 
the instrument.17 These States include two nuclear powers (the United States 
and China) and several States which, though not deemed to be nuclear-weapon 
State by the terms of the NPT, have conducted nuclear test explosions or are 
  
 15 On the Soviet-American agreements see Smith, S.: US-Soviet Strategic Nuclear 
Arms Control. From SALT to START to STOP. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, op. 
cit., 49–74. 
 16 Cf. Kile, S. N.–Fechenko, V.–Kristensen, H. M: World Nuclear Forces, 2006. SIPRI 
Yearbook 2006. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, 2006. 644. 
 17 Under its Art. XIV, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is to enter into 
force 180 days after its signature and ratification by 44 States as enumerated in Annex 2. 
Until August 2008 the Treaty was ratified by 35 out of the 44 States. 
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capable of doing so.18 The cause of nuclear disarmament is greatly prejudiced 
by these States’ reluctance to ratify the CTBT, although a reference to nuclear 
disarmament is also found in the Preamble of the NPT to the effect that the 
Parties to the Treaty “Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible 
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures 
in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”  
 However, all these international instruments mentioned above could not 
hid the fact that there is no result in the conclusion of a convention on the 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, although 
the question of nuclear disarmament was on the agenda of the General Assembly 
and the Conference on Disarmament of Geneva since the beginning of the 
1980s.  
 The only international instrument connected with nuclear weapons concluded 
in the post-Cold War era was the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005.19 The making of that instrument was 
necessiteted by the threat that terror agents can construct or acquire nuclear 
weapons, or they might built “dirty bombs”, and by the fear that nuclear instal-
lations could be the target of terrorist groups’ attack.20  
 
b) Discriminatory character of the NPT 
 
Already from the beginning the NPT was challenged of being discriminatory, 
pointing out that the Treaty creates unequal obligations for States and 
distinguishes between the Contracting Parties according to whether in 1967 
they were qualified as nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States.21 
The underlying reason of that argument being that whereas the freedom of 
action of the non-nuclear-weapon States is greatly restricted by the Treaty, the 
same does not hold for the nuclear-weapon States. Precisely on this ground it 
  
 18 Among those States, mention may be made of Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea 
and Pakistan. 
 19 The Convention on Nuclear Terrorism entered into force on July 7, 2007. 
 20 On the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism see Joyner, C. C.: Countering Nuclear 
Terrorism: A Conventional Response. European Journal of International Law, 18 (2007) 
225–251. 
 21 According to Art. IX. Para, 3.  
 “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”. 
  E.g. India refused to accede to the Treaty by invoking its discriminative character. 
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is maintained by many that “the NPT starts to appear as a device for freezing 
the world power structure”.22  
 This claim is absolutely true in so far as the NPT required the non-nuclear-
weapon States to renounce acquisition in any form of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
explosive devices, but it did not do so in respect of the nuclear-weapon States. 
It should nevertheless be stressed that, since complete nuclear disarmament is 
by all means the long-term objective–notably the desideratum to remove this 
destructive type of weapons from the arsenals of States–, there is perhaps a 
hopeful possibility that mankind will some time come to see that such weapons 
are not possessed by the nuclear-weapon States either. 
 It is indisputable that the NPT differentiates between the Contracting Parties 
by dividing them to nuclear-weapon States and to non-nuclear-weapon States. 
Most of the rights and obligations of the States Party to the Treaty depend on 
their status under the Treaty i.e. whether they have the right to posses nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices, or this is forbidden to them. In that 
perspective their is an inequality between the Contracting Parties, five of them 
have the right to posses nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and all 
the other Contracting Parties are so called non-nuclear weapon States which 
had to renounce the possession of these weapons and devices and had to submit 
all their peaceful nuclear activities to the safeguards system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.23 
 However, John Simpson is right in poining out on this score that the Treaty’s 
“discriminative” character and the freeze imposed by it on the existing world 
power structure “do not appear to outweigh the particular security advantages 
offered by the NPT”.24 
 It should be stressed that the Treaty intends to keep the above mentioned 
inequality in certain limits and it tries, especially in the field of the peaceful 
utilization of nuclear energy, to compensate by the provisions on the coopera-
tion in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  
 
  
 22 Cf. Simpson, J.: The Non-Proliferation Treaty at its Half-Life. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. op. cit. 6. 
 23 Under Art. III. the International Atomic Energy Agency has to apply its safeguard 
system to all nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT in order to 
verify the fulfilment of their obligations assumed in the Treaty with a view of preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.  
 24 Simpson: op.cit. 6.  
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c) The withdrawal of the Treaty 
 
The decades which have passed since the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty have proved that the instrument’s provision on withdrawal is a weak-
ness thereof, namely the fact that the Treaty may be denounced through a rather 
simple procedure, a State leaving with relative ease the regime which has been 
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.  
 
Art. X. Para. 1, of the Treaty runs as follows:  
 
“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to 
withadraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to 
the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests 
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to 
the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events 
it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” 
 
 As is noted by Jozef Goldblat, the problem with this provision lies in the 
State itself being entitled to decide on the existence of “extraordinary events”, 
on whether such events have cocurred at all, the State being under no obligation 
to justify its action. Furthermore, the kind of extraordinary event the drafters 
had in mind–other than that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a potential 
adversary–is not clear from wording of the Treaty.25 Fortunately, during the past 
40 years, the NPT was denounced by one State only, DPRK,26 but at the same 
time threats to denuonce it were also voiced by other State (e. g. Iran) as well. 
 Another problem with the provisions on withrawal of the NPT is that if a 
non-nuclear-weapon State chooses to denounce the Treaty, that is, it leaves the 
NPT regime, the international community ceases to have any information about 
the purpose for which that State, once free from its obligations under the NPT, 
intends to use the nuclear materials it posses and the technical knowledge it has 
acquired as a party to the Treaty. This is all the more so since the safeguards 
agreements on IAEA control will also remain in force until such time as the 
  
 25 Goldblat, J.: Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. PRIO. Inter-
national Peace and Research Institute. Oslo, 1994. 82. 
 26 In March 1993 North Korea announced its intention to leave the NPT and then, in 
June of the same year, it suspended the execution of its withdrawal. Yet, with effect from 
11 January 2003, it definitely denounced the NPT. We shall revert to the case of North 
Korea later on. 
126 VANDA LAMM 
  
State concerned is a party to the NPT. Thus, in the last analysis, the inter-
national community is exposed to the danger that the denouncing State will 
undermine the non-proliferation regime as a whole. 
 Eventual withdrawal from the NPT by a State or States might produce a 
highly dangerous domino effect in the sense that eventually other States will 
reconsider their participation in the NPT. Especially because States have 
undertaken their non-proliferation obligations in respect to each other or to one 
another is likely to come into play in the case of the NPT more strongly than 
in that of any other treaty. Considering that a State not possessing nuclear 
weapons has renounced acquisition, possession, etc. of such weapons in the 
hope that other States not possessing nuclear weapons will undertake similar 
obligations, and it would certainly like to receive a guarantee that nuclear 
weapons will not be used against it. It will be remarked, parenthetically, that 
the fears of States about the eventual use of nuclear weapons are but increased 
to some extent by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons since the Court failed to 
give a definite answer “as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its 
very survival would be at stake”.27 
 Obviously, any effort to prescribe stricter rules on withdrawal from the 
NPT would raise a whole range of legal and political issues. At the same time, 
however, one must not overlook the fact that the provisions on withdrawal 
were formulated at the time when the success of the NPT regime was far from 
sure. It was not by chance that the instrument was originally concluded for 25 
years, with a decision on the extension of the Treaty following the expiry of 
that term. At the time of conclusion it was not possible to know how the first 
25 years of the Treaty’s life would shape up and what would happen in inter-
national politics during that period. Precisely for that reason, the possible 
solutions after the first 25 years were articulated in advance. In other words, it 
was laid down in the Treaty itself that by the lapse of 25 years a decision may 
be made as to whether (i) to keep the Treaty in effect indefinitely, or (ii) to 
extend for an additional fixed period or periods.28 These provisions were by all 
means intended to rule out the possibility to terminate the Treaty after the lapse 
of 25 years.  
  
 27 Cf. Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Advisory Opinion, 8 July 
1996. I.C.J. Reports, 1996. 263. 
 On the Advisory Opinion see Matheson: op. cit. 417–435. 
 28 Cf. Art. X. Para. 2, of the NPT. 
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 However, the four decades since the conclusion of the NPT have proved 
to the viability of the regime as well as to the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of the States does make serious efforts to prevent the world-wide proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. This is borne out by 188 contracting States to the NPT 
and by the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the Fifth Review and Extension 
Conference. 
 As can be seen, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has by our days become a treaty 
with indifinite duration and is one of the multilateral international instruments 
of whose importance and necessity the international community of the States 
is earnestly convinced. All this naturally leads one to ask whether mankind has 
by now reached the state at which to make the NPT obligations everlasting, 
keeping in mind the final object of the complete nuclear disarmament. To 
restrict in some form the withdrawal from the NPT can be conceived of as a 
first step towards this goals. 
 Restiricting the withrawal from a treaty is not unknown to international law 
at all. Typical instances are the conventions on humanitarian law, but also worth 
noting is the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpilling, Pro-
duction and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa 
Treaty), providing in Art. XX. that the “instrument of withdrawal shall include a 
full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal” and that if during 
the six months of notice of withdrawal “the withdrawing State Party is engaged 
in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the 
armed conflict.” Incidentally, publicists have recorded treaties which by their very 
nature are unlikely to be capable of withdrawal are treaties of peace, disarme-
ment and those establishing permanenet regimes, such as for the Suez Canal.29  
  It would obviously be not easy to amend the NPT in the direction of 
prescribing stricter conditions for withdrawal, yet this question should also 
certainly be addressed, and it could be on the agenda of the next NPT Review 
Conference to be held in 2010. 
 
 
II. The inalienable right to develop, research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes  
 
Since the first attempts to restrict the possession of nuclear weapons by certain 
States it was a long debated question how to reconcile these restrictions with 
the peaceful utilization and development of nuclear energy. In other words, 
how to assure the peaceful utilization and development of nuclear energy in 
  
 29 Cf. Aust, A.: Modern Treaty Law and Practice. Cambridge, 2002. 234. 
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those States which will renounce of any possession of nuclear weapons. That 
problem arose because according to a number of States the restrictions on the 
possession of nuclear weapons influence or even hamper the peaceful utiliza-
tion and development of nuclear energy.  
 Knowing that was not surprising that in the 1960s during the talks on the 
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was a key-issue how to 
secure the progress of peaceful nuclear industry in States giving up the 
possession of nuclear weapons, and should they get some reward for that.  
 At the Geneva talks several delegations tried to present the development of 
the peaceful nuclear industry in such a way as being dependent to the possession 
of nuclear weapons. Needless to say that this is totally misinterpretation of the 
development of nuclear industry in the middle of the 20th century. It is true 
that the progress of peaceful nuclear industry was stick to the manufacturing 
of nuclear weapons; or even one can say that the peaceful nuclear industry was 
to some extent the by-product of the military nuclear industry. But this was 
due first of all to the military and political situation at end and after the 
Second World War. The States spent billion of dollars, roubles or pounds to the 
research works connected to nuclear weapons and as a consequence the nuclear 
weapon industry developed considerably and also the knowledge on the 
possibilities of the peaceful utilization of nuclear materials evolved. But if these 
huge amounts of money were to be spent only to the development of the 
peaceful nuclear industry, the progress would be the same, as the example of 
several States without nuclear weapons capacity show to us. One can say that 
there is no direct connection between the possession of nuclear weapons and 
the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. A State could have very developed 
peaceful nuclear industry without the possession of nuclear weapons. In that 
connection one can refer to Canada, Germany, and other States as well. 
 During the negotiations on the NPT a number of small and medium-size non-
nuclear-weapon States, in return to undertake not to get any possession and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons advocated to receive certain compensation and 
promises for greater cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  
 After long debates two sets of provisions were included in the NPT,30 both 
of them giving guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States to have access to 
the benefits of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.  
 The first set of these provisions are in the Preamble and Art. IV. securing 
the right to all parties to the Treaty to develop research, produce and use of 
nuclear energy. The other guarantees are included also in the Preamble and 
  
 30 It is worth mentioning that the American and Russian drafts of 1965 and 1966, 
contained no provisions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  
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Art. V. of the Treaty providing on the sharing of non-nuclear-weapon States in 
the benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.  
 The detailed provisions on the share of the non-nuclear-weapon States in 
the benefits of these explosions are the consequence of the fact that explosive 
devices used for peaceful nuclear explosions are the same as those built in 
nuclear weapons, and therefore the Treaty prohibits any kind of acquisition of 
these devises to non-nuclear-weapon States.  
 The other reason was that at the time of the conclusion of the NPT there 
were great hopes in the utilisation of peaceful nuclear explosions in the extraction 
of mineral resources, construction of canals, tunnels, etc. Therefore the non-
nuclear-weapon States had real fearing that by their accession to the NPT they 
would renounce to utilise that very important tool of civil engineering.  
 
a) The “inalienable right” is not an unlimited right 
 
As it was mentioned before, on the wish of the non-nuclear-weapon States, in 
the Preamble and in Art. IV. special clauses were included in the NPT on the 
right of these States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In Para. 1, of Art. 
IV, the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was formulated by a so 
called interpretative provision,31 which says that  
 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right 
of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity 
with Articles I. and II. of this Treaty”.  
 
According to writers of international law this kind of interpretative provision 
aims to exclude a certain interpretation given to a treaty, creating a clear 
situation and prohibiting an otherwise possible interpretation.32 
 Speaking on the right of non-nuclear weapon States to the peaceful uses, 
development, research of nuclear energy, the NPT qualifies that right as 
“inalienable”, which means that the non-nuclear-weapon States could not be 
deprived of this right or this right is not capable of being taken away.  
 
  
 31 This technique is well known in international treaty practice and e.g. one can find 
similar provision in Art. IV. Para. 1. of the Antarctic Treaty.  
 32 Cf. Haraszti, G.: A nemzetközi szerződések értelmezésének alapvető kérdései (Basic 
problems of the interpretation of international treaties). Budapest, 1965. 88. 
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 As we could see the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
is subject of two limitations: namely, that right should exist without discrimi-
nation and this right is not unlimited and it is subordinated to Art.s I, and II, 
containing the basic undertakings to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons.  
 The inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is not an 
unlimited right. Para. 1, of Art. IV, makes clear that the right to the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy should be “in conformity with Articles I. and II. of this 
Treaty”. Thus under Art. IV. the non-nuclear-weapon States’ right to develop 
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is secondary 
to the fundamental obligations accepted by all the Contracting Parties with 
regard to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the 
fundamental purpose of the Treaty to halt the dissemination of nuclear weapons. 
The right to develop research, production etc. of nuclear energy could not 
serve to the evasion of the basic commitment of the non-nuclear weapons 
States under the Treaty, not to acquire in any form nuclear weapons or nuclear 
explosive devises and the development, research, production and use of 
nuclear energy could not lead to the violation of the basic provisions of the 
Treaty. The subordination of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy to 
Art.s I, and II, indicates, that no kind of peaceful nuclear activity could be 
tolerated which result in any form of the production or acquisition of nuclear 
weapons or nuclear explosive devices by the non-nuclear weapons States.  
 Since the entry into force of the NPT the right to the peaceful utilization of 
nuclear energy and the interpretation given to Art. IV, of the NPT was dealt by 
numerous international conferences, forums etc, and among others it was on 
the agenda of the NPT review conferences, which has special importance in 
that respect since the task of these conferences is, according to Para. 3 of Art. 
VIII., to review the operation of the Treaty “with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.” 
 One can say that all review conferences strongly reaffirmed the right of all 
parties to the NPT to develop research, to produce and to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes.33 
 
  
 33 See Decision 2 adopted at the Fifth Review and Extension Conference, on “Prin-
ciples and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, Para. 14. Ibid. 26. In 
2000 the Sixth Review Conference not only reaffirmed the inalienable right of all parties 
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Art.s I.–III. of the Treaty, but 
even it adopted a decision in which the Conference recognized “that this right constituted 
one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty”. Cf. Part I, and II. p. 8. Para 2. 
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b) International cooperation 
 
Para. 2, of Art. IV, treats the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. The first sentence of that paragraph provides that  
 
“All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.”  
 
Thus according to this sentence all parties to the Treaty should facilitate the 
exchange of information etc. although as we know, not all the Contracting 
Parties were at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty or even now-a-days in 
a position to do that. The second sentence of that paragraph regarding interna-
tional cooperation is more precise because it refers only to those parties to the 
Treaty which are in an appropriate position (under the Treaty: “which are in a 
position to do so”) and these States should co-operate in contributing “to the 
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, 
with due consideration for the need of the developing areas of the world”.  
 Thus in connection with the international cooperation the Treaty expressly 
says that in the course of international cooperation the Parties should take into 
consideration the demand of developing areas of the world. 
 The co-operation in contributing to the further development of the application 
of nuclear energy could be executed by States Party alone or together with 
other States or international organizations, which gives broad discretion to the 
States Party and creates new perspectives for the development of international 
co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And, as the Third Review 
Conference stressed, international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy could contribute to the elimination of technological and economic 
differences between the developed and developing countries.34 
 By comparing the provisions on the exchange of information and cooperation 
regarding to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (Art. IV.) with those concerning the peaceful nuclear explosions (Art. V.) 
one can conclude that Art. IV. is far less concrete than Art. V.  
 
  
 34 Cf. Third Review Conference of the NPT. See in United Nations Disarmament 
Yearbook, 10 (1985) 179. 
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 Art. IV. is rather general, while Art. V. lays down the most important condi-
tions of the share of non-nuclear-weapon States in the benefits of peaceful 
nuclear explosions. Thus under Art. V. the potential benefits of the peaceful 
nuclear explosions to non-nuclear weapon States i.) should be made available on 
non-discriminatory basis, ii.) the charge to such parties for the explosive devises 
used will be as low as possible, iii.) the charge should not include any charge 
for research and development. iv.) the negotiations on this subject shall start as 
soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force.  
 The above mentioned differences between Art. IV. and V. are due, among 
others, to the fact that at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty it was 
considered as a big sacrifice by the non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce of 
the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosion devices and to calm 
these States detailed provisions were included in the Treaty on the conditions 
of non-nuclear-weapons States’ shares in the benefits of these explosion devices. 
 The 1995 Review and Extension Conference when interpreting Art. IV. of 
the NPT, added two very important conditions to the international cooperation 
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, saying that preferential treatment 
should be given to the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty in all 
activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that the 
transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be prompted.35  
 Although the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy is prosperous, both on bilateral basis and under the auspices of the 
IAEA, there is wide divergence of views between the nuclear-weapon States 
on the one hand, and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, on a number 
of questions connected with international cooperation. On different occasions 
several non-nuclear-weapon States have challenged some developed States, 
particularly the nuclear Powers, not to fulfil their obligations under Art. IV. 
The nuclear-weapon States, to prevent nuclear proliferation due to nuclear 
exports and imports, tried to establish special arrangements for nuclear exports, 
which were again considered by a number of non-nuclear-weapon States as 
additional restrictions to their access to nuclear technologies. 
 
 
 
  
 35 Decision 2 on the “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament”. Para. 16. and 17. See United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 20 (1995) 27.  
The reference to preferential treatment of non-nuclear-weapon States was repeated in the 
document adopted at the Sixth Review Conference held in 2000.  
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III. Other proliferation risks  
 
The NPT although containing detailed provisions on the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons it treats only nuclear weapons and explosive 
devices and is silent on some other nuclear activities which could lead to the 
production of nuclear weapons.36 It should be mentioned that already not long 
after the conclusion of the Treaty several authors pointed out to these gaps.37 
 By our days it has become clear that uranium enrichment and production 
of plutonium entail tremendous risks to non-proliferation, since the related 
technologies are capable of obtaining fissionable materials necessary for the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. Another short-coming of the NPT can be said 
to lie in the absence of provisions on the trade of nuclear materials and transfer 
of nuclear technologies and assuring that they will not result in support for 
military nuclear programs.  
 
a) Unranium enrichment and production of plutonium 
 
The problems relating to uranium enrichment and production of plutonium were 
addressed by several delegates at the Seventh NPT Review Conference, and 
Art. 4 of the Treaty was mentioned as one of the weakest provisions thereof. It 
was claimed that the “inalienable right” of non-nuclear-weapon States potentially 
allowed those States to put into operation, under the pretext of their peaceful 
nuclear programs, such facilities which are capable of manufacturing nuclear 
weapons.38 With a view to averting the inherent proliferation risks, the Review 
Conference considered the proposals which advocated international cooperation 
in uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing as well as control over 
repositories for spent fuel and nuclear waste.39 These initiatives, however, were 
conceived by several non-nuclear-weapon States to place further limitations 
on their rights of access to nuclear technologies.40 
 More than 25 years after the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty the 
aforementioned short-coming of the instrument came into the focus of attention 
principally in connection with Iran’s nuclear program, when several sources 
  
 36 On the shortcomings of the NPT see also the present writer’s treatise: The Utiliza-
tion of Nuclear Energy and International Law. Budapest, 1984. 94–97. 
 37 Cf. Courteix, S.: Exportations nucléaires et non-proliferation. Paris, 1978. 4. 
 38 Cf. Kile, S. N.: Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. SIPRI Yearbook 2006. 
op. cit. 611. 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 Ibid. 611–612. 
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said, as will be discussed later, that under the guise of developing the country’s 
peaceful nuclear industry a secret nuclear program was being implemented, 
with Iran attempting to produce plutonium and enriched uranium. 
 
b) Nuclear exports 
 
As early as the 1970s there were adopted certain restraints, both in internal 
laws and on the international plane, in order to ensure that trade in nuclear 
equipment, materials, etc. should not be allowed except in accordance with the 
NPT. This issue received still greater emphasis after the nuclear explosion by India 
in 1974, which led to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (hereafter 
NSG) with the aim of blocking the way to unauthorized nuclear activities by 
nuclear exports.41 
 The NSG’s activity was of little, if any, relevance for quite a few years, but 
the NSG became increasingly active as from the 1990s, with its Warsaw session 
of 1992 resulting in an agreement of States on Guidelines for Transfers of 
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology (the 
so-called Warsaw Guidelines).42 No doubt that the Guidelines are not deemed 
to be a binding instrument of international law, but, considering that the 
substance thereof came to be incorporated in the internal laws of the NSG 
States, their application is obligatory. Under the Warsaw Guidelines specific 
rules of verification govern the nuclear materials and equipment that are capable 
of being used in both lawful and nuclear-weapon-related programs. The Annex 
to the document has listed the materials, equipment, etc.43 that may only be 
exported to those non-nuclear-weapon States whose present and future nuclear 
activities as a whole come under IAEA safeguards. There can be but two 
exceptions to full safeguards control: on the one hand, an extraordinary circum-
stance, in which an item on the list is required for the safe operation of a facility 
subject to safeguards control and, on the other hand, a given transaction takes 
place on the basis of an agreement signed before 3 April 1992.  
 These provisions were tightened further after 11 September 2001, when the 
President of the United States called on the 40 member states of the NSG not 
to sell equipment and technology necessary for uranium enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing to the States not possessing enriching or reprocessing 
  
 41 No treaty was concluded for the establishment of the Group, at present 45 States are 
participating in the NSG’s work. On the NSG see IAEA INFCIRC /539/ rev. 3. 
 42 See IAEA INFCIRC /254/rev.1/ Part 2, July 1992. 
 43 There are 67 kinds of equipment and material enumerated in the Annex. See IAEA 
INFICIRC/254/Rev.1/ Part 2, note 91. 
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facilities in operation. So, according to the American proposal, such installa-
tions, equipment and technologies may only be transferred to a state which 
was a party to the NPT on 1 December 2003 and operates an enriching and 
reprocessing facility which has not been closed definitively and is subject to 
IAEA safeguards control. All this means in effect that trade in enriching and 
reprocessing facilities is limited to the trade among the five nuclear-weapon 
States, to Japan, and, in the case of enriching facilities, to Argentina, Brazil, 
Germany and the Netherlands.44 
 The problems relating to the exportation of nuclear materials and equip-
ment have given rise to some concern in respect of India during the most recent 
years.  
 As noted earlier, India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in 
1974 it conducted a nuclear explosion, insisting that it was engaged in peaceful 
nuclear activity. Nevertheless, that explosion turned India into a de facto 
nuclear-weapon State, altrough it is doubtless that, under the NPT, considered 
as nuclear-weapon States are only those that carried out a nuclear explosion 
prior to 1 January 1967. In this connection, however, the real problem concerns 
not the category to which India is nominally consigned, but the fact that, on 
the one hand, there is an admittedly nuclear-weapon State which is not a party 
to the NPT, with only a fraction of that State’s nuclear activity being under 
IAEA safeguards control,45 and, on the other hand, one wonder if, from the point 
of view of trade in nuclear materials and equipment, India is deemed to be a 
nuclear-weapon or a non-nuclear-weapon State. 
 It is in recent years that India’s status under the NPT has come into particularly 
sharp focus since in 2005 the United States and India signed an agreement on 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.46 As is pointed out by publicists, that 
  
 44 Cf. Michel, Q.: Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. Nuclear Law Bulletin, 79 (2007) No. 2. 21. 
 45 IAEA safeguards control as applied in respect of India is similar to that implemented 
in respect of nuclear-weapon States insofar as no more than certain nuclear facilities are 
under Agency safeguards on the basis of voluntary submission, whereas in the case of non-
nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT the totality of a given State’s nuclear activities is 
subject to verification. 
 46 On 18 July 2005 President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India issued 
a joint statement entitled „Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative” containing, among others, 
a commitment by the US to “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation” and 
trade with India; while India pledged to separ its civilian and military nuclear facilities 
and programmes, to place under IAEA safeguards its civilian facilities, to continue its 
unuilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, etc. That document was followed by a further 
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agreement has brought a radical change in the non-proliferation policy of the 
United States, because India nuclear-weapon State not party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and whose nuclear activity has not been under IAEA 
control up to now.47 The agreement is therefore open to objection in two 
aspects, since the question arises, on the one hand, of how such an agreement 
can be reconciled with the non-proliferation obligations assumed by the 
United States in various treaties, particularly the NPT,48 and, on the other 
hand, of whether the agreement is not in contradiction with the provisions of 
different international instruments on the trade of nuclear materials and 
equipment as well as of the internal law of the United States and India.49 It 
appears that the Indian-American agreement also runs counter to the Warsaw 
Guidelines accepted by the United States, and that the agreement has for some 
time divided the NSG States, several of which objected to lifting the nuclear 
trade embargo which had been ordered against India 34 years before.50 By 
September 2008, however, the NSG States had finally agreed on lifting the 
embargo, and the United States Congress approved the agreement with India at 
the end of September of the same year.51 
 In order to extend IAEA safeguards on Indian nuclear installations, since 
November 2007 the IAEA and India conducted negotiations on safeguards 
agreement, what was finally signed by the Parties in February 2009. In the 
future, under that agreement additional 14 India nuclear reactors are expected 
to be under IAEA safeguards.52 
                                                     
accord of the Ministers of Defence on cooperation between the two countries in the field 
of missile defence.  
 On the accord see Ahlström, C.: Legal Aspects of the Indian-US Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation Initiative. SIPRI Yearbook 2006. op. cit. 668–685.  
 47 See Michel: op. cit. 682–685. 
 48 Along with these treaties, mention may be made of Security Council Resolution 
1172 of 1998 calling upon the member States of the United Nations to block trade in any 
nuclear material or technology that would in any way promote Indian and Pakistani weapons 
programmes or ballistic missile programmes for nuclear delivery vehicles. 
 49 On this score see Ahlström: op. cit. 682–685. 
 50 At the Vienna Conference of the NSG States, held at the end of August 2008, 
France, Russia and the United States came out for lifting the embargo, while Austria, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and New-Zealand were strongly against 
doing so. 
 51 At the time of closing the manuscript of this study, the agreement did not have the 
Senate’s approval required for its entry into force. 
 52 The agreement will enter into force on the date the IAEA receives from India written 
notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been 
met. 
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IV. A few words about the “problematic” States 
 
1. The Iranian nuclear program 
 
The problems with Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, when evidence 
showed that the Islamic Republic of Iran was constructing two undeclared 
nuclear fuel facilities south of Teheran.53 The IAEA has since sought to shed 
light on Iran’s uranium enrichment and heavy water programs first of all in 
the framework of safeguards agreements.54 Teheran, however, has refused to 
cooperate with the Agency, and the Iranian nuclear program being and remain-
ing intransparent for the IAEA.55 The problem with Iran has for long years 
reside in the fact that, on the one hand, the question is left open whether or 
not they operate secret nuclear installations in the country and, on the other, 
whether activities prohibited by the NPT are not being carried out at the 
declared nuclear installations. 
 The international efforts for a solution of the problems relating to Iran’s 
nuclear program have been exerted for years basically along two main lines. 
One line is that of the IAEA and the Security Council and bears upon Iran’s 
obligations under the NPT and the safeguards system of the IAEA, and it was 
submitted to the Security Council and wich lead to imposing of sanctions on 
Iran. The other strand is that of diplomatic efforts, for which the take-off point 
was marked by the talks which three EU member states (France, Germany and 
                                                     
 Some of India’s nuclear facilities (six in number) have for years been under IAEA 
safeguards by the terms of the agreement between the Agency and India, but this number 
affects only a fraction of India’s nuclear activity. 
 IAEA control over additional facilities is not feasible unless India strictly separates its 
military and peaceful nuclear programmes. On this score see IAEA INFCIRC/731. 
 53 The start of Iran’s nuclear programme goes back to 1959, when the US-supplied 
experimental reactor was put into operation. In the Shah’s time it was planned to build 23 
nuclear power plants up to 1990. The programme was stagnant for years because of the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Iraqi-Iranian war, but from the mid-1980s a start was 
made on its continuation. An Iranian announcement of 2002 said that reactors of a 
combined capacity of 6,000 Mwe would be constructed during the following 20 years. For 
Iran’s nuclear programme, see Kile, S. N.: Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. 
SIPRI Yearbook 2004. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, 2004, 
604–612.  
 54 The safeguards agreement between Iran and the Agency is dated 13 December 1974. 
See IAEA INFCIRC/214. 
 55 In 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement on 
verification, but it has not ratified it to date. 
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the United Kingdom–the so-called EU-3) initiated with Iran in 2003,56 with 
China, Russia and the United States joining in from 2006 and with the active 
participation of chief EU representative of common foreign and security policy. 
 As noted previously, the IAEA has for years been dealing with Iran’s 
nuclear program, the Agency’s General Conference and Board of Governors 
adopting numerous resolutions on the matter, Iran, however, failed to comply 
with the Board resolutions and continued its uranium enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities.57 This finally led to the Board deciding to report “Iran’s 
nuclear dossier” before the Security Council on 4 February 2006.58 Board 
Resolution 2006/27 emphasized that even more than three years of effort had 
stopped short of clarifying all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, the gaps in 
the Agency’s information had continued to give cause for concern, and the 
Agency was not in a position to ascertain whether there were not being carried 
out any undeclared nuclear activities in Iran.  
 On 31 July of that same year the Security Council adopted its Resolution 
1696 (2006) on Iran’s nuclear program,59 calling upon Iran to take the steps 
required by IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14 and to 
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The Resolution 
made it clear that if Iran failed to comply with that resolution, the Council will 
adopt appropriate measures under Art. 41. of the Charter. Since Iran had failed 
to give evidence of having suspended of its uranium enrichment activity and heavy 
water project, to implement the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, 
the Security Council adopted several resolutions imposing sanctions against 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, these were Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747(2007), 
1803(2008).60 The Council’s Resolutions 1737 and 1747 are among its rare 
  
 56 The legal basis of the talks was provided by the Paris Agreement of 15 November 
2004. For the instrument, see IAEA INFCIRC/637. 
 In the Agreement Iran reaffirmed its intention not to acquire nuclear weapons in 
keeping with Art. II. of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it pledged itself to full and 
complete cooperation with the IAEA.  
 For the talks between Iran and the EU-3, see Kile, S. N.: Nuclear arms control non-
proliferation. SIPRI Yearbook 2006. op. cit. 619–623, 629–630.  
 57 On 1 August 2005 Iran notified the IAEA of continuing its uranium enrichment 
programme. 
 58 Cf. IAEA Board Resolutions GOV/2006/14. Sea also IAEA Board Resolutions 
GOV/2006/15, GOV/2006/27, GOV/2006/38. 
 59 The resolution was carried by 14 votes in favour and 1 vote (Qatar) against. 
 60 These sanctions have banned Iran’s arms export, freezed the assets of private persons, 
entities engaged in the country’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as well as on the 
development of nuclear delivery systems. The Security Council resolutions even called 
upon States to restrain the entry into or transit through their territories of individual who 
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cases deciding on sanctions by unanimous votes, a fact indicative in the first 
place of the gravity of the situation and of the proliferation risks inherent in 
Iran’s secret nuclear program.61 
 As mentioned earlier, the diplomatic talks seeking a solution to the Iranian 
nuclear problems have been under way, with longer or shorter interruptions, 
since 2003. Participating in them are Iran on the one hand and, on the other, 
six States (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) as well as the chief EU representative of common foreign and 
security policy. The foremost aim of the discussions is to have Iran give up its 
uranium enrichment program in its entirety. In June 2006 the “Six” presented 
to Iran a proposal for a long-term comprehensive agreement, with a view to 
seeking a comphensive, long-term and proper solution on the problem and to 
develop cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the stablishment 
of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear 
program.62 In its response to the proposal Iran said it was not engaged in any 
prohibited activity and that otherwise, in developing its peaceful nuclear 
industry, it was making use of its right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
as recognized by Art. 4 of the NPT.63 Some progress toward a settlement of 
the situation is indicated by the events in the summer of 2008; among them 
emphasis is deserved, on the one hand, by Iran’s Note of 16 June to IAEA, in 
which the Teheran Government expressed its readiness to conduct constructive 
negotiations within six months,64 and, on the other hand, by the Note of 25 
June 2008, which, formulated by the “Six” with the support of the chief EU 
                                                     
are engaged in directly or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The names of key 
persones, entities, etc. concerned were enumerated in the Annexes. 
In its resolution 1835(2008) of 27 September 2008 the Security Council reaffirmed the 
provisions of its previous resolutions on Iranian nuclear issue and called upon “Iran to 
comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the previous resolutions of the 
Security Council, and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors.” 
 61 It should be mentioned that this kind of sanctions imposing Security Council’s 
resolutions and the Security Council’s anti-terror resolutions were strongly criticised by 
several authors.  
 62 For the proposal, see UN A/61/514-S, 2006/806.  
 63 For Iran’s response to the proposal, see IAEA INFCIRC/685. 
According to some views, Iran’s persistence in its nuclear programme is made suspicious 
by the fact that Iran is one of the world’s richest countries in oil resources and that it can 
in no way be said to face with energy problems. Nonetheless, Iran has repeatedly stated the 
same, namely that nuclear energy serves to meet national energy needs, while it wishes to 
use its revenues from oil and gas for increasing its foreign exchange reserves. 
 64 For the Iranian Note, see IAEA INFCIRC/729. 
140 VANDA LAMM 
  
representative of common foreign and security policy, contains very detailed 
proposals for various facets of cooperation with Iran in the fields of politics, 
economy and regional security, but makes related negotiations conditional on 
Iran’s ceasing its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities in 
compliance with Security Council Resolution 1803.65  
 However, according to the last report submitted by the Director General to 
the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2009, since Iran does not implement 
the transparency measures required by the Security Council, the Agency is 
still not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.66 
 
2. DPRK’s nuclear issue 
 
The concern about the nuclear program of the DPRK emerged after the country 
had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the full-scope safeguards 
agreement with IAEA as required by the NPT had entered into force in 1992.67 
 From the very beginning there had been contradictions between the data 
reported by DPRK to the IAEA under the safeguards agreement and the results 
of the Agency’s analysis, and, according to the IAEA, there existed in the DPRK 
undeclared plutonium. With a view to clarifying the situation, the Agency 
requested access to additional information and initiated on-site inspections, but 
the DPRK rejected them and, moreover, informed the world public in March 
1993 of its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.68 However, as a 
result of the negotiations between the DPRK and the United States, the 
DPRK announced, one day before the expiry of the 30 days’ notice of with-
  
 65 For the proposal, see IAEA INFCIRC/730. 
 66 Cf. IAEA GOV/2009/8. 
 67 The first experimental nuclear reactor of North Korea was built in Yongbyon with 
Soviet assistance and started operation in the 1960s. From the end of the 1970s North 
Korea has sought to have its nuclear programme gradually achieve a „status of its own”, 
without the need to rely on foreign assistance. 
 For the safeguards agreement, see IAEA INFCIRC/403. 
 68 North Korea said that its withdrawal from the NPT had been motivated by, inter alia, 
the US military manoeuvres threatening the country with nuclear war. After the notification 
of withdrawal the three depositaries of the Treaty–the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom 
and the United States–published a joint declaration questioning the real cause for with-
drawal as stated by North Korea to be „exceptional circumstances relating to the substance of 
the Treaty” under Art. X. Para. 1, thereof and „jeopardizing the higher interests” of the 
country. At the time the withdrawal by North Korea was also dealt with by the Security 
Council, which in Resolution 825 (1993) called upon that country to reconsider its decision. 
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drawal, the suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT for as long “as it 
considers necessary.”69 
 Since that country continued raising obstacles to IAEA inspections in 
violations of the safeguards agreement, the case of the DPRK was considered 
both by the IAEA Board of Governors and, on the basis of its report, by the 
Security Council. The situation was further complicated by the DPRK’s with-
drawal on 13 June 1994 from the International Atomic Energy Agency, of 
which it had been a member for 20 years. There is no doubt that this step 
entailed an interruption of relations between the Agency and the DPRK in a 
certain aspect, but at the same time the country’s withdrawal from the Agency 
did not affect its contractual bligations under the NPT and the safeguards 
agreement concluded as required by that Treaty. 
 In the autumn of 1994 the North Korean nuclear crisis seemed to be lessened 
somewhat insofar as the United States and the DPRK signed a framework 
agreement (the so-called Agreed Framework)70 at Geneva on 21 October 1994, 
to the effect that the United States would build two light water reactors in the 
DPRK71 in return for the latter country halting the construction of its nuclear 
research centre in Yongbyon and giving up its nuclear weapon program.72 
 This notwithstanding, the following years witnessed the continuation of 
verification-related disputes between the DPRK and IAEA. The greatest problem 
concerning the DPRK’s nuclear program lay in that the Agency actually never 
having had an opportunity to receive an overall picture of the DPRK’s nuclear 
activity and to satisfy itself in a manner admitting of no doubt that the country’s 
nuclear industry was serving peaceful purposes, and in that, as mentioned 
already, the IAEA had been of the position since 1993 that the DPRK was not 
  
 69 Thereafter North Korea agreed to limited safeguards control, but these steps fell 
short of clarifying the question whether North Korea was really using its declared nuclear 
facilities for peaceful purposes. 
 70 For the Agreed Framework, see http://www.Kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework 
 71 Also, the Agreement provided for the normalization of economic and political 
relations between the two States, the promotion of cooperation in the field of peace and 
security on the Korean Peninsula, and stated, inter alia, that North Korea would remain a 
party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
 72 With the aim of implementing the agreement of 1994, the United States and North 
Korea set up in 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to 
which adhered later Australia and New-Zealand; Argentina, Chile and Indonesia in 1996; 
the European Union and Poland in 1997; the Czech Republic in 1999; and by Uzbekistan 
in 2000. Owing to North Korea’s continuous breach of its obligations under the agree-
ments, the Executive Board of KEDO decided to discontinue the light water project on 31 
May 2006. 
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acting in compliance with the provisions of the safeguards agreement. The 
Agency’s suspicion was heightened by the implementation of secret uranium 
enrichment programs in the DPRK, the inobservance of the American-North 
Korean framework agreement of 1994, and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors 
from the country.  
 In 2002 North Korea came to openly concede its implementation of a 
uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapon purposes. That admission not 
only offended the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement, but 
also ran counter to other international documents, such as, inter alia, the joint 
declaration of North and South Korea concerning the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula.73 
 Afterwards North Korea was unwilling to cooperate with the IAEA in any 
way, to comply with the provisions of the safeguard agreement, and announced 
instead, that it would withdraw from the NPT with effect from 11 January 2003. 
 In an endeavour to resolve the security problems associated with North 
Korea’s nuclear weapon program there were started negotiations in August 
2003 with the participation of the United States, Russia, the Republic of China 
and Japan, along with the representations of the two Koreas.74 The negotia-
tions were conducted in several rounds, with dangers of an ultimate break 
thereof, when in February 2005, for instance, North Korea announced that it 
was in possession of a nuclear weapon and concurrently suspended its participa-
tion in the six-party negotiations for an indefinite period. The discussions 
nevertheless ended up yielding results in that the parties adopted a Joint 
Declaration, in which North Korea, afflicted as it was by immense poverty and 
famine, undertook in principle, in exchange for food aid and energy sources, 
to end its nuclear program, return to the NPT, and apply the IAEA safeguards 
system. Yet, for all that, on 9 October 2006 it informed the world public that it 
had carried out an experimental nuclear explosion, which consequently led to 
the interruption of the negotiations.75 
  
 73 In December 1991 North and South Korea signed a declaration on denuclearization, 
committing themselves not to possess either nuclear weapons or plutonium reprocessing 
and uranium enrichment facilities, and to conduct negotiations on a mutual verification 
system. Still, as early as 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea was secretly 
engaged in plutonium reprocessing. 
 74 The nuclear program of North Korea was looked at ab initio with particular concern 
by the neighbouring States of Asia, fearing that North Korea’s nuclear policy would generate 
a nuclear arms race in the region. Cf. Lee, K. B.: North Korean nuclear development, 
missiles and energy crisis. Cf. Friend of North Korean People, 18 (2004) 55. 
 75 In the wake of the North Korean nuclear explosion the Security Council, in its 
Resolution 1718 of 14 October 2006 adopted by a unanimous vote, ordered the application 
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 However, owing to Beijing’s pressure on North Korea, the negotiations 
were resumed in February 2007. On 13 February of that year an agreement 
was reached in Beijing to the effect that, in return for economic, energetic and 
humanitarian assistance, North Korea undertook to end its nuclear program for 
military purposes and to ensure that the shutting down and disablement of its 
nuclear centre in Yongbyon would take place under IAEA control. First it 
appeared that North Korea had observed the provisions of the aforementioned 
agreement for a few months only, and on 24 September 2008 it requested the 
IAEA to remove the Agency’s seal from the Yongbyon centre, while announcing 
that reprocessing would go on at the installation and that from that point of 
time the Agency’s inspectors would have no access thereto. But, according to 
the letest information, in the DPRK the IAEA has continued to monitor and 
verfy the shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and the fuel rods 
discharges from the facility are under Agency surveillance.76  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The NPT is one of the most important treaties which, concluded in the middle 
of the 20th century, have considerably enhanced the cause of nuclear disarma-
ment during the past period of more than four decades. When emphasizing the 
significance of the Treaty one cannot be silent about certain weaknesses of its 
regime, of which reference is made by many to the discriminative character of 
the NPT. 
 By its structure and provisions the Non-Proliferation Treaty has divided the 
States into two groups, distinguishing those possessing and those not possessing 
nuclear weapons at the time the Treaty was concluded. In effect, the rights and 
obligations of the States party to the NPT are tailored to the group to which 
they belong, and the gravest violation of the NPT is that when States seek to 
change their status as defined in the NPT, notably by trying to gain control of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
 Under the NPT, research in and production and application of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes are “inalienable rights”, but their exercise should 
                                                     
of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, calling on Pyongyang not to carry out any 
further nuclear tests nor to launch ballistic missiles, to return forthwith to the NPT, and to 
accept safeguards control by the IAEA. 
 76 Cf. IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors on 2 
March 2009. However, some weeks later, on 15 April 2009 the DPRK has announced of 
ceasing all cooperation with the IAEA and asked the Agency’s inspectors to leave the 
county at the earliest possible time. 
144 VANDA LAMM 
  
be in keeping with the basic obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States under the 
Treaty not to acquire in any form nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices and not to carry out unauthorized nuclear activities under the guise of 
their peaceful nuclear programs. 
 The 40th anniversary of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the four decades that have passed since the Treaty’s entry into force, and the 
next Review Conference will afford a good opportunity77 to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime, perhaps in form of a protocol annexed to the NPT. 
Adoption of such a document is necessitated by the fact that there are new 
dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation coming into view in our days. 
 If the States of the international community are in real earnest about the 
cause of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they should make 
every effort to assist the non-nuclear-weapon States in the implementation of 
their peaceful nuclear programmes, for it is abundantly clear that international 
cooperation, surrounded with reliable guarantees, in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy is of paramount importance to non-proliferation. 
 
  
 77 The negotiations concerning the preparation of the next Review Conference, due to 
be held in 2010, have been under way since 2007. 
